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A. Introductionl 
I. Purpose of the analysis 
A wide variety of instruments and mechanisms for the regulation and 
control of chemic~ls and pesticides are already available internationally. 
What is missing is an analysis which attempts to systemize the different 
approaches, create transparency, define overlappings and discover 
prospective deficiencies and shortcomings. In order to accomplish this task 
we have chosen to cover legally binding mies as weil as recommendations 
aml codes, the international soft-law. The paper's overall purpose is to 
outline a frame for the future regulation on chemicals and pesticides at the 
international level. An international convention might be one solution2 
II. Points needing clarification 
The analysis of the international legal instruments needs some 
clarification, not only in order to determine the scope of the report, but also 
2 
2 
Rcviscd vcrsion of thc rcport prcsented to lRPTCilJJ\'EP Ad Hoc Working Group of 
Expcrl' on thc lmplcmcntation of thc Amendcd London Guidelines, First scssion, 
Nairobi. 15-19 October 1990, Analysis of Intemationai Legal Instruments to thc 
Regulation and Control of the Production :md Usc of Chemicals, 
llNEP/PIC. WG.'.1/lnf.4. II October 1990. Footnotcs and refcrenccs are rcstricted to 
those which arc indispensable for the rcading and thc undcrstanding of thc text. The 
facts on thc cxisting lcvcl of regulation in thc nation statcs arc largcly bascd on 
(1) Administrative and Legislative Aspccts of Chcmicals Control, Comparativc 
Analysis of Sclcctcd Issucs, OECD 1985, cited as OECD Comparative Analysis. 
(2) Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts for the Exchange of Information on 
Potcnlially Harmful Chcmicals (in particular Pesticides in International Trade), 
Sccond session, Romc, 28 January - 1 February 1985, Comparativc Survcy of 
National Notification Procedurcs and Legislative Definitions, Report prcparcd by thc 
sccrctariat, with consultant assistance (E.Rchbinder as emphasized by H.-W.M.) in 
cooperation with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europc, 
UNEP/WG.112/4; cited as UNEP Comparative Survey. 
Cf. Ph. Afston, International Regulation of Toxic Chcmicals, Ecology Law Quartcrly 
7 (1978), 397-456; M. Kloepfer, Aspekte der internationalen Hannonisierung des 
Umweltrechts - Zur Rechtsvergleichung und Rcchtwereinhcitlichung im 
Chemikalienrecht, UPR 1984/9, 281 et seq. 
to supply a framework which facilitates the orientation and formulation of a 
policy in the field of chemicals and pesticides. 
The London Guidelines3 like a number of other national initiatives 
cover chemicals and pesticides. It should be clear that the report deals with 
both categories. Bringing together chemicals and pesticides in one single 
report entails a number of difficulties. Chemical regulation and pesticide 
regulation follow different regulatory schemes, at least in the legislation of 
industrialized countries. This might be different in developing countries. But 
the more the Iegislation is scrutinized, the more differentiated it becomes 
and each product, whether chemicals, pesticides, food additives, cosmetics 
or medicines, is dealt with separately. International regulation must consider 
these differences and respond to regulations, that are specific to the product. 
The UNEP GC Decision 15/3ü4 refers to "other activities related to the 
production and use of chemicals". Once again, clarification is needed. 
International regulation might concern the trade in chemicals but it might 
also concern the production, as in the case of the ILO Convention 
"Safety in the use of chemicals at work5". A distinction can be made 
between process and product regulation6: process regulation aims at the 
regulation of the manufacturing process, product regulation at the regulation 
of trade. The analysis focuses on product regulation, although process 
regulation is taken into consideration mainly in the context of the feasibility 
to ban the production and not only the use of certain extremely dangerous 
chemicals and pesticides. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
London Guidclines for the Exchange of Information on Chcmicals in International 
Trade, Amendc<l 1989. 
Decision 15/30 of lhe Goveming Council of the UnilCd Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) at its fiflhtecnlh session of 25 May 1989 on "'Environmentally 
safe managcment of chcmicals, in particular those that are banned or scvcrcly 
restricted in international trade". 
International Labour Organisation, convention conccrning Safety in the use of 
chemicals at work, 1990. 
Cf. E.Rchbindcr/R.Stewart, Environmental Protection Policy, in: Integration Through 
Law, Europc and thc Federal Experience, A Series under thc General Editorship of 
M.Cappelletti, M.Scccombe, J.H.H. Weiler, 1985. 
3 
The last point needing clarification concerns the type of instruments 
available internationally chemical regulations . One possibility could be to 
look at the "hannonization" of the different national approaches in order to 
define a level of protection and control which would be acceptable to 
countries all over the world. The FAQ Code on the Distribution and Use of 
Pesticides7 would came under that harmonization category. Another 
possibility could bc to start from the idea that the differences in regulating 
chemicals should subsist, that mechanisms, however, must be found to 
bridge the differences between exporting and importing countries. The 
London Guidelines8 and all other efforts9 to regulate the export of banned 
and severely restricted products would come under this category. The 
intention of such an approach does not seem to be to abolish the existing 
differences in the legal status of regulated chemicals and pesticides but to 
find ways and means which secure their trade although they are banned or 
severely restricted. The analysis should therefore clearly distinguish 
between efforts that attempt to harrnonize chemical regulation 
internationally and efforts that aim to balance differences in the regulatory 
status of chemicals and pesticides. 
Ill. Scope of the analysis 
The analysis cannot be restricted to international efforts. lt must take 
into consideration the key role of some industrialized countries in regulating 
chemicals and pesticides. Specific emphasis is put on the role of the 
European Community. With its policy of completing the internal 
market by 199210, the European Comrnunity seems to have become the 
most important international organization in developing regulatory 
frameworks for bringing together different national schemes in one 
supranational concept. European initiatives to harrnonize chemical and 
7 
8 
9 
4 
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Usc of Pcsticides (Amended 
Version), 1990. 
Cf. Loc. cit. 
Cf. For further details, supra B.V. 
pesticide regulation gain importance far beyond the borders of the twelve 
member states. Due to the enonnous impact of the intemal market on EFTA 
countries, the Europeanisation of chemical and pesticide regulation based on 
Community law seems to be close at hand. lt is against the background of 
the European Community regulations on pesticides and chemicals and the 
numerous regulatory efforts of other industrialized countries, that 
international efforts on behalf of the FAO, the GATI and ILO might be 
analyzed. 
Tue different national, regional and international laws and regulations 
will be analyzed following the devclopment of regulatory instruments and 
strategies to fight risks to man and the environment. Regulation traditionally 
starts in industrialized countries, with efforts to define the conditions under 
which the trade with chemicals and pesticides could be managedll. The 
overall perspective here is to protect the user of the product as weil as the 
workers who are coming into contact with it. Regulation has been adopted 
to classify the products according to the 1isks, to develop packaging 
and labelling standards and advertising rules. Then the emphasis shifts 
from trade regulation to access-to-market regulation. Nation states 
take over the responsibility of protecting their citizens and the environment 
against possible harm resulting from dangerous chemicals and pesticides, 
before they are brought onto the market. 
There are different regulatory models, notification procedures, 
registration and, or licensing procedures at stake, but they all intend to 
guarantee preventive protection against potential risks. The shift from trade 
regulation to access-to-market regulation seems logical in order to increase 
the degree of protection. But even access to market rules can not guarantee 
sufficient protection to man and the environment in the long run. lt seems a 
common characteristic of chemicals and pesticides that their dangerous 
10 Cf. For an analysis, R.Bicbcr/R.Dchoussc/J.Pindcr/J.H.H.Wcilcr (Eds.) 1992: One 
European Markct? A critical analysis of the Commission's Interna! Market Strategy, 
1988. 
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nature is unknown at the moment when they are brought onto the market, 
but becomes clear after years of use and experience. Then the question 
arises of how and if these products can be taken away off the market. The 
termini.Js technicus for regulatory efforts to get rid of the products which 
have proven to be dangerous, is "post market contro! 12". 
The analysis of export regulation focuses on existing mechanisms to 
regulate the exports of chemicals by international and by regional 
organisations, UNEP, FAO, UN, OECD, GATT, EEC as well as on the 
national regulations of these countries. Information exchange procedures, 
export notifications and the recently introduced Prior Informed Consent 
(PIC) procedure define the requirements for trade with banned and severely 
restricted chemicals. 
B. National, regional and international regulation of 
pesticides and chemicals 
1. Regulatory concepts, common goals and definitions 
The overall trend in chemicals and pesticides reguiation is to leave the 
narrow borders of regulatory concepts aiming at the protection of 
man against the exposure of chemicals and pesticides and to integrate into 
the regulatory concept the protection of the enviroDJDent . This 
extension entails a shift from protection against acute damage or 
imminent danger to potential hazards. Regulatory actions are 
no longer Iimited to cases where actual hann has already occurred, the 
actions rather aim at protecting man and the environment against the risks 
11 
12 
6 
Cf. With respect to the regulation of pesticides; H.-W.Micklitz, Zur Geschichte des 
deutschen Pflanzenschutzrechts, in E.Rehbindcr (Hrsg.), Bremer Kolloquium über 
Pflanzenschutz, 1991, 44 et seq. 
Cf. H.-W.Micklitz (cd.) Post market control of consumcr goods, ZERP 
Schriftenreihe, Band 11, 1990. 
associated with chemicals. Therefore, the notions of "risk", "hazard", or 
"danger" are crucial notions in all laws and regulations 13. 
The goal of protecting man and the environment against risks may be 
incorporated in a particular law in different ways. The OECD Paper on 
Administrative and Legislative Aspects of Chemical ControI 14, as weil as 
the UNEP Comparative Survey of National Notification Procedures and 
Legislative Definitions 15 distinguish between 16 
(1) the notion of risk forming part of a general statement of purpose 
(goals provisions) of a particular Jaw; 
(2) the notion of risk being incorporated in statutory provisions that 
describe individual duties of care, especially in countries that vest in 
the manufacturer or importer the primary responsibility for assessing 
the risks associated with chemicals; 
(3) chemical laws which set forth a number of risk categorie5 which 
represent defined dangerous properties of chemicals and 
(4) risk criteria being spelled out in statutory provisions that authorize 
agencies to take specific regulatory action. 
Further details can be drawn from the OECD and the UNEP papers 17. 
The overall trends, reported in these two analyses have been strengthened 
and specified. No common approach, however, can be found in the question 
of whether and to what extent occupational health and safety should be 
integrated into chemicals and pesticides regulation. For some countries Iike 
the United Kingdom, occupational health and safety regulation seems 
crucial for the development of sophisticated chemical regulation: other 
countries, like the FRG, i.e„ are integrating aspects of occupational health 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Cf. E.Rehbindcr/D.Kayscr/H.Klein, Chemikalicngcsct7. Kommentar und 
Rechtsvorschriften zum Chemikalienrecht, Einführung 37 et seq. 
Cf. Loc.cit. 
Cf. Loc.cit. 
Cf. OECD Comparative Analysis, Nos. 6, 13. 
Cf. OECD Comparative Analysis and UNEP Comparativc Survcy. 
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and safety into chemicals and pesticides regulation 
(Gefahrstoffverordnung) 18. 
The integration of the protection of the environment into chemical and 
pesticides regulation constitutes a shift from product rel.ated to 
media-related regulation19. Product related regulation focuses 
on the specific risks of the respective products (chemicals, pesticides); 
media-related n:gulation aims at the protection of man and environment 
independent of the nature of the respective product. A media-related 
approach encompasses all kinds of products, chemicals, pesticides, 
medicines, food additives, cosmetics and raises the question as to what 
extent criteria can be found to protect man and environment against 
potential risks. Even modern chernical laws do not really pursue a media-
related approach. There are elernents of a media related approach, but 
exernption clauses make clear that product related regulations overrule 
media-related chemical regulation. This differentiation which is quite 
cornmon in most of the industrialized countries leads to the paradoxical 
consequence that the purpose of use decides on the applicable legislation. 
To say it the other way round: Pesticides, medicines, food additives, 
cosrnetics are all "chemicals", the purpose they are destined for, however, 
makes it necessary either to apply specific product-related laws or to refer 
back to the basic chemical regulation. Thal is why chemical regulation, in 
practice, focuses on industrial chemicals as a specific category of products 
being distinguished from pesticides and other "chemicals" like rnedicines or 
food additives. 
Product-related regulation requires a definition of the legal scope. 
There is no common understanding on what is to be understood by a 
"chemical" or a "pesticide". In the field of chernicals, specific difficulties 
18 
8 
Cf. E.Rehhindcr, Harmonisierung des Chemikalienrechts 
Harmonisierungswirkungen der Richtlinie 79/831/EWG in den Mitgliedstaaten der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften im Lichte des dcut,chen Rechts, Schriften der 
Gesellschaft für Rechtspolitik Band 3 Chemikalienrecht 1986, 79-139 (quoted as 
Chemikalienrecht). The report is an analysis on the implcmcntation of the so-callcd 
sixth amendmcnt of the chemicals directive. 
arise from differentiating between "industrially manufactured chemicals" 
and so-called "preparations". The EEC Directives 67/54820 on dangerous 
substances and 89/C 89/02 (draft)21 on pesticides provide some guidance on 
what is to be understood by a chemical or a pesticide. Guidance does not 
mean that all possible problems are already solved. It is still unclear whether 
"preparations" containing one chemical substance which comes under the 
6th Amendment do fall under the scope of the directive or whether 
"preparations" are excluded from the directive22. The OECD has developed 
a glossary of the definitions used within chemical Iegislations in 
industrialized nations, mainly member countries of OECD23. Tue glossary is 
helpful in understanding regulatory differences, but it shows at the same 
time that there is not yet a common understanding, not even among the 
industrialized nations. The same is more or less true for the definition of 
pesticides. The respective EEC Draft Directive 89/C/89 0224 provides for a 
common framework for the 12 member states, but the definition given here 
is different from the notion in the US FIFRA legislation25. Under an 
international perspective the FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution and 
U se supplies a glossary which is instrumental for the international regulation 
of pesticides26. 
As far as the selection of control action is concerned, 
there are still substantial differences in the language and the structure of the 
laws27. The relationship between different levels of risks, the basis of their 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Cf. E.Rehhindcr/D.Kayscr/H.Klein, Kommcnlar, Einführung 21 et scq. 
Council Dircctive of 18 September 1979 amending for thc sixth time Dircctive 
67/548 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the classification, packaging and labclling of dangcrous substances, OJ L 
259, 15.10.1979, 10 et seq. 
OJ C 89, 10.4.1989, 22 et seq. 
Cf. E.Rehbinder, Chemikalienrecht, loc.cit. 
OECD Glossary. 
OJ C 89, 10.4.1989, 22 et seq. 
Cf. Thc Fcdcral Insccticide, Fungicidc, and Rodcnticidc Act as Amended, Sec. 2 
Definitions (u). 
Cf. FAO Code, loc.cit. Art. 2. 
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determination and the selection of control action is subject to different 
national regulatory approaches. One might summarize the findings of 
OECD Analysis and the UNEP Comparative Survey28" in the arising 
concept of a "hierarchical system" that links differing degrees of risks to the 
selection of control action. Under this system, levels of stringency of 
controls are triggered by corresponding levels of risk. There is an 
interdependence between the degree of risk and the intensity of regulation 29. 
Modem chemical and pesticide laws do not require a causal link 
between the potential risk and the substance concemect30. Statistical 
evidence and scientific research indicating that a hazard exists usually 
suffices to legitimate preventive action. However, if measures are taken into 
consideration to restrict or ban the use or production of a specific chemical 
or pesticide, the mere potentiality of a risk does not justify action-taking. 
More concrete evidence is needed if action could and should be taken. One 
might even draw the conclusion from the experience with chemical and 
pesticide legislation in industrialized countries that market restrictions are 
adopted only in cases where the causal link between the damage and the 
substance can no longer be denied. Although it is already a long way from 
the potential risk to the acute risk, there is a third category to be reported 
which requires an even higher degree of ris~. than in the case of market 
restriction. Reference shall be made to so-called emergency situations3 1. 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
10 
Cf. UNEP Comparative Survey, No.69. 
Cf. Loc.cit. 
Cf. UNEP Comparativc Survey, No.70. 
Cf. OECD Comparativc Report, No.18. 
Cf. For a more comprchensive analysis in the contcxt of product safety eontrol, H.-
W.Micklitz (ed), Wahrung der Produktsicherheit in dringenden Fällen - Aspekte der 
praktischen Durchführung in den Mitgliedstaaten, Studie im Auftrag der Kommission 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Consumer Policy Service, Vertrags-Nr. 
6674/89/12, Typoscript Bremen November 1990. 
Here, it is indeed the existence of an imminent <langer which triggers mostly 
intermediary action to mitigate the risk32_ 
Other countries Jeave their control agencies more discretion in 
selecting the appropriate means. This is panicularly true for the United 
States where there is a sequence of increasingly stringent prerequisites (in 
terms of probability of risks and necessary basis for its determination) from 
imposition of a testing obligation via control action in the absence of 
sufficient infonnation to final control action33_ Although the regulatory 
approach between the European Community and its member states on the 
one hand and the United States on the other, seems to be different in actual 
practice, the interdependence between the degree of risk and selection of 
control action is striking. 
There are, however, some inherent limits which are, though varying in 
their legal grounding, recognized in most legal systems, and at times even 
backed by constitutional law and/or constitutional jurisdiction. These 
limiting rules require agencies according to the OECD Report34: 
a) not to overstep the limits of discretion set out in a law or inherently 
contained in a delegation of powers; 
b) not to disregard the scope of discretion available under a legal 
authorization; 
c) to make use of the discretionary powers in a fair and reasonable 
manner, avoiding arbitrariness, clear errors of judgment and other 
abuses of discretion. 
Tables visualize the linkage between control action and the degree of 
<langer. They show a complicated and sophisticated system which leaves 
some doubt on whether the finely tuned differences in hazards and actions 
are manageable by the agencies. 
32 
33 
34 
Cf. UNEP Comparative Survey, No. 70, this is the systcm that cxisls in the European 
Community and it~ mcmber states. 
Cf. UNEP Comparative Survey, No. 71. 
Cf. OECD Comparative Analysis, No. 59. 
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In adopting specific legislation on chemicals and pesticides, nation 
states are taking over the responsibility to protect their citizens and the 
environment against risks resulting from unsafe chemicals and pesticides. 
Accepting a statutory responsibility for the safety and the environment 
entails far-reaching consequences at the constitutional level 35. lt is no 
longer the liberal state who guarantees at the constitutional level individual 
rights to liberty and freedom. lt is the new welfare state who is accepting the 
responsibility to guarantee protection, safety and a healthy environment. 
Such an extension of responsibilities is not limited to industrialized 
countries. Here, the classical liberal rights might be interpreted in the light 
of the new statutory functions as it is the case in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. New democracics Iike Portugal and Spain or Brazil have laid 
down in their constitution state objectives making it a constitutional task to 
engage in the protection of man and the environment. But even where 
health, safety and environmental protection is not discussed at the 
constitutional level, the existence of a statutory responsibility seems to be 
widely accepted. The United States constitution does not recognize social 
rights3°. The constitution is limited to classical liberal rights, to protect 
individual liberty and freedom. But the United States have developed within 
the last twenty years the farest-reaching statutory laws on chemicals, 
pesticides and other devices guaranteeing th~ protection of man and his 
environment. 
At the international level, Art. 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights induces a right to safety37, the 1972 
Stockholm declaration is still the Magna Charta for the emergence of a right 
to a healthy environment38. The legal status of the documents is subject to a 
controversial debate. But their mere existence makes it clear that even on 
35 
36 
37 
12 
Cf. H.-W.Micklitz, Consumer Rights, in A.Casscsc/A.Clapham/J.H.H. Weiler, 
Human Rights and thc European Community: The Substantive Law, 1991, 53 et scq. 
Cf E. Grabitz, Grundrechte in Europa und USA, 1986 Band 1, Strukturen nationaler 
Systeme. 
Art. 12 rccogni1cs thc right to physical and mental hcalth, cf. for futhcr dctails, H.-
W.Micklitz, Consumcr Rights, loc.cit. JV.3.b. 
the international floor, the right to safety and the right to a healthy 
environment is now an important question to be taken in hand. Both could 
form the background for the legitimate developmems of an international 
order on the regulation of chemicals and pesticides. In the long run, 
international regulations have to integrate in trade regulations health, safety 
and environmental aspects39. 
II. Classification, labelling, packaging and advertising 
In the history of chemical and pesticide regulation, rules on risk 
classification, on associating specific risks to labelling requirements and the 
establishment of packaging rules constituted the very first step in the 
development of chemicals and pesticides regulation. 
1. Classification 
The EEC Directive 67/548/EEC on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions related to the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances (chemicals) provides 
for 14 factors determining the hazardous characteristics within the meaning 
of the directive: explosive, oxydizing, extremely flammable, highly 
flammable, flammable, very toxic, toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritant, 
dangerous for the environment, carcinogenic, teratogenic, mutagenic40. The 
EEC Directive 78/631 on the approximation of laws on the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations (pesticides) 
provides for a similar classification scheme in the field of pesticides41. 
These rank from very toxic, toxic to harmful. Classification is based 
primarily on the acute oral and dermal toxicity to the rat since these 
38 
39 
40 
Cf. Ph.Alston, loc.cit. 410 et seq. 
F.L. Kirgis, Effcctive Pollution Contra! in Jndustrializcd Countries: International 
Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses and the GATT, 70 Michigan Law 
Review, 1972, 859 et seq.; cf. also S. Rubin & T. Graham (cds.), Environment and 
Tradc 1982; H. Gröncr, Umweltschutzbcdingtc Produktnormen als nichttarifäres 
Handelshemmnis, in H. Gutzlcr (ed.) Umweltpolitik und Wettbewerb, 1981, 143 et 
seq. 
Cf. Loc.cit. Art. 2 (2). 
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determining factors are standard procedures in toxicology. The EEC 
Directive 88;37942 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the member states relating to the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations extends the 
very same classification approach to preparations other than pesticides. The 
classification scheme follows the principles laid down in Directive 67 /548 
on dangerous chemical substances, supplemented by specific provisions on 
the explosive, oxydizing, extremely flammable, highly f!ammable or 
flammable property. The set of these three directives provides for a common 
classification scheme of dangerous substances, pesticides and preparations 
throughout the EEC. They facilitate orientation on the market and enhance 
the development of regulatory concepts based on classification. 
At the international level, numerous international organizations have 
developed classification schemes; it might suffice to recall the efforts of 
WHO and IRPTC in the field of chemicals pesticides and medicines. 
However, most of these classification systems are not Iinked to labelling and 
packaging requiremems. There are two notable differences. The ILO 
Convention requires specific criteria and systems appropriate for the 
classification of all chemicals according to the type and degree of their 
intrinsic hazards43. According to the "Reco'Tlmendations", classification 
should be based on characteristics such as: toxic properties including both 
acute and chronic health effects in all target organs; chemical or physical 
characteristics, including flammable, explosive, oxidizing and dangerously 
reactive properties; corrosive and irritant properties; carcinogenic effects; 
allergenic and sensitizing effects; teratogenic and mutagenic effects and 
effects on the reproductive system44. From a lawyer's point of view the 
prerequisites seem tobe similar to the EEC Directive 67/548. 
41 
42 
43 
44 
14 
OJ L 206, 29.7.1978, 13 et scq. Art. 3. 
Cf. OJ L 187, 16.7.1988, 14 et scq. Art. 3 (1). 
Cf. Loc.cit. Art. 6. 
Cf. Loc.cit. undcr II. 6. 
The FAQ Code refers to the WHO recommended classification of 
pesticides by hazards as the starting point for labelling and packaging 
requirements45. Classification in the WHO recommended scheme differs 
from the EEC Directive 78/63146 because it distinguishes four categories of 
hazards: extremely hazardous, highly hazardous, moderately hazardous, 
slightly hazardous. 
2. Labelling and packaging 
At the EEC level, marketing of classified chemicals, pesticides and 
preparations is bound to labelling and packaging requirements. Although the 
labelling and packaging requirements differ according to the category of 
products concemed, the basic concept derives from Directive 67 /548. 
Packaging must satisfy the following requirements47: 
(a) it shall be so designed and constructed that its content cannot 
escape; this requirement shall not apply where special safety devices 
are prescri bed; 
(b) the materials cönstituting the packaging and fastening must not be 
susceptibel to adverse attack by the contents, or liable to form harmful 
or dangerous compounds with the contents; 
(c) packaging and fastening must be strong and solid throughout to 
ensure that they will not loosen and will safely meet the normal 
stresses and strains of handling; 
(d) containers fitted with replaceable fastening devices shall be so 
designed that the packaging can be repeatedly refastened without the 
content escaping. 
Member states are allowed to go beyond that mandatory level and to 
prescribe that packages shall initially be closed with a sea\ so that when the 
package is opened for the first time, the seal is irrepairably damaged; that 
containers with a capacity not exceeding three Iitres which contain 
dangerous substances intended for domestic use shall have child resistent 
fastening; that containers with a capacity not exceeding one Iitre which 
45 
46 
47 
Cf. Art. 10.2.3. loc.cit. 
Cf. Loc.cit. 
Cf. Loc.cit. Art. 16. 
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contain very toxic, toxic or corrosive liquids intended for domestic use shall 
ca.rry a tactile warning of <langer. The options for packaging mies on child 
resistent fastenings and tactile warning of <langer have been subject to 
controversial debate throughout the Community. Here, the member states' 
packaging rules differ considerabJy48. 
The packaging rules are supplemented by labelling rules. According to 
Directive 67 /548 member states have to ensure that dangerous substances 
cannot be placed on the market unless the labelling on their packages 
satisfies the following requirements49: 
Every package shall show clearly the name of the 
substance, the origin of the substance, the <langer symbol, 
when laid down, an indication of <langer involved in the 
use of the substance, standard phrases indicating the 
special risks arising from such dangers, standard phrases 
indicating the safety advice relating to the use of the 
substance. 
These factors are then spelled out in the direcrive in some detail. 
Harmonization is total, some derogations are allowed though, but the 
member states are then obliged to inform the Commission thereof. The two 
directives on pesticides 78/63 t 50 and on dangerous preparations 88/37951 
supplement these prerequisites by providing further product-related 
labelling requirements. It is hard to distinguish the different packaging and 
labelling rules on dangerous substances, pesticides and preparations. Even 
the Community seems to be somewhat confused, as it has indicated in its 
last directive on dangerous preparations 88/379, that a review should be 
undertaken to find out where the differences between the rules are, and 
where there are loopholes which must be regulatect52. For an international 
perspective, it is important that the labelling and packaging mies in the 
48 
49 
50 
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Cf. E.Rchbindcr, Chemikalienrecht, loc.cit. 
Cf. Loc.cit. Art 17. 
Cf. Loc.cit. 
Cf. Loc.cit. 
Community have led to a total hannonization. That means, products 
classified, labelled and packed according to these three directives can be 
marketed all over the Community. There is, however, one exception: As far 
as there are products which do not fall within the scope of the three 
directives, considerable differences between national legislations still 
subsist. 
At the international level, packaging and labelling rules on pesticides 
and chemicals are mentioned in the GA IT Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade53. In its preamble, the agreement urges the panies to ensure that 
technical regulations and Standards, including packaging, marking and 
labelling requirements, and methods for certifying confomüty with technical 
regulations and standards, do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade. The agreement, however, does not lay down minimum 
requirements in any form as to the labelling and packaging of chemicals and 
pesticides as such. The approach used here is to try to get away with 
possible technical barriers to trade which result from deviating labelling and 
packaging standards. 
Quite specific rules on the labelling of chemicals and pesticides can be 
found in the Convention on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work. The 
primary addressee of the "labelling and marking requirements" in the 
convention, is the employee, although ihe convention applies to all branches 
of economic activity in which chemicals are used, including production, 
handling, storage, transpon and disposal in enterprises54. 
An. 7 of the convention requires signatory states to make sure that 
hazardous chemicals are labelled so as to provide essential information 
regarding their identity, their classification, the hazards they present and the 
safety precautions to be observed. The requirements of what should be 
52 
53 
54 
Cf. Loc.cit. 1 S. 
Cf. Agreement on Tcchnical Barricrs to Tradc, GATT 1979, now under rcvision in 
the Uruguay Round. 
Cf. Loc.cit. Art. 7, Recommcndations undcr 11.8. 
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understood by labelling are then tobe found in the "Recommendations"55. 
Here it is specified that labelling requirements should cover in conformity 
with existing national or international systems: 
(a) the information to be given on the labe! such as trade names, 
identity of the chemical, name, address and telephone number of the 
supplier, danger symbols, nature of the special risk associated with the 
use of the chemical, safety advice including first aid, identification of 
the batch, the statement that the data sheet giving additional 
information is available from the employer, 
(b) the legibility, durability, and size of the labe! and 
(c) the uniformity of labels including colours. 
Chemkal safety data and information sheets shall be established by 
the competent authorities and then be provided to the employers. There is no 
link, however, between the classification and the labelling and packaging 
with a view to the marketing of chemicals and pesticides. Information on the 
dangerous aspects of chemicals and pesticides could be improved indirectly 
here, but the Convention is not aiming to regulate the trade with or 
production of chemicals and pesticides. 
The FAO Code of Conduc156, institutes responsibilities of industry 
and governments on labelling and packaging for chemcial safety, here 
mainly pesticides. Pesticide containers should be clearly labelled in 
accordance with applicable international guidelines such as the FAO 
guidelines on good labelling practices57. Art. 10 of the FAQ Code then 
requires industry: 
55 
56 
57 
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to use labels that include recommendations consistent with those of 
the recognized research and advisory agencies in the country of sale, 
to include appropriate symbols and pictograms whenever possible in 
addition to written instructions, warnings and precautions, 
Cf. Loc.cit. undcr 11.8. 
Cf. Loc.cit. Art. 10. 
Guidclines on good labclling practice of pcsticidcs, FAO 1985; Pictograms for 
pcsticidc labcls, FAO. 
to use labels that in international trade clearly show appropriate WHO 
hazard classification of the contents or, if this is inappropriate or 
inconsistent with the national regulations, use the relevant 
classification; 
to include in the propriate language or languages, a warning against 
the reuse of containers and instructions for the safe disposal or 
decontamination of empty containers; 
to identify each lot or batch of product in numbers or letters that can 
be read, transcribed or communicated by anyone, without the need for 
codes or other means or deciphering; 
to use labels that are marked with the date, month and year of 
formulation of the Jot or batch and with the relevant information on 
the storage stability of the product. 
Art. 10. (3) refers to packaging, storage and disposal of pesticides 
which should be in conformity with the principles laid down in the FAO 
Guidelines for the Packaging and Storage of Pesticides58, the FAO 
Guidelines on the Disposal and Surplus Pesticides and Pesticides 
Containers59, and the WHO Specifications for Pesticides used in Public 
Health60. Last but not least, governments are invited to take the necessary 
regulatory rneasures to prohibit the repacking, decanting or dispensing of 
any pesticide into food or beverage containers in trade channels and rigidly 
enforce punitive measures that effectively deter such practices. 
The FAO labelling and packaging rules, although not mandatory, are 
coming close to the essence of the national and regional rules. They provide 
indeed for a minimum standard in labelling and packaging, a minimum 
standard which has not yet been achieved in the field of chemical substances 
and preparations. 
3. Advertising 
Even modern chemical laws do not provide for mandatory rules on 
advertising. This Jack is due to the fact that chemical laws, in principle, are 
restricted in their scope to industrially manufactured chemicals; they 
exclude preparations dedicated to end users. That is why advertising rules 
58 
59 
Adopted in 1985. 
Adopted in 1985. 
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are in principle outside the regulatory perspectives of chemicals. This is not 
the case when chemicals are sold in a manufactured form to end users like 
preparations or pesticides. Here, advertising rules might be of importance to 
the user. This is particularly true for pesticides, where unfair practices have 
been reported mainly from Third World countries61. Industrialized countries 
have not developed specific rules for the advertising of pesticides. The 
advertising of pesticides is usually subject to rules and regulations 
concerning unfair marketing practices. The point of reference is not a 
specific category or product but the market transaction. Equivalent rules do 
not yet exist on the international level. There are regulatory efforts by the 
International Chamber of Commerce or the United Nations that attempt to 
Iay down codes on fair practices. 
Particular efforts can be seen in the FAO Code of Conduct. Art. 11 
provides extensive rules for the regulation of advertising with pesticides. 
The primary addressee of Art. 11 is industry itself, but international 
organizations and public sector groups are invited to call intention, to 
departures from this articJe62. Govemments are encouraged under this code, 
to work with manufacturers to take advantage of their niarketing skills and 
infrastructures in order to provide for public service advertising regarding 
the safe and effective use of pesticides. Advertising could then focus on 
such factors as the proper maintenance and use of equipment, special 
precautions for children and pregnant women, the danger of reusing 
containers and the importance of following labe! directions. Although these 
rules are quite general in nature and in principle apply to all kind of 
transactions wherever they take place, they are shaped according to the 
needs of the international trade between the pesticide producing country and 
the Third World importing country. 
60 
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World Hcalth Organisation, 1985. 
Cf. D.Wcir/M.Shapiro Circlc of Poison, Pcsticidcs and thc Pcoplc in a Hungry 
World, 1981; D.Bull, A growing problcm, pcsticidcs and thc Third World Poor, 
1982; IOCU, Thc Pcsticide Poising Report, A survcy of somc Asian countircs by Foo 
Gail< Sim, Pcnang, 1985. 
III. Pre-market control of chemicals and pesticides 
The Council Directive amending for the sixth time Directive 67/54863 
on dangerous substances, limits the scope of application explicitly to 
newly marketed products. The US TSCA64 quite to the contrary, provides 
explicitly for control of "old chemicals" as well as of "new" chemicals. 
Pesticide control regulations suffer from the same sort. Any kind of pre-
market control presupposes in principle that all those products which shall 
be marketed are presented to statutory review and not those which are 
already marketed65. 
1. Spectrum of preventive control measures 
Three types of preventive control might be distinguished66. Prior 
approval procedure, notification procedure and regulatory mechanisms 
where the primary responsibility rests with the manufacturer. The last 
category presupposes that there is no statutory regulation on chemicals and 
pesticides and that the manufacturer alone has to decide which kind of 
product he will manufacture and under what conditions he will offer the 
product on the market. Most of the industrialized countries have introduced 
either prior approval procedures or notification procedures, but there is still 
a considerable number of developing countries where there is no pre-market 
control of chemicals and pesticides67. One could understand notification 
62 
63 
64 
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Cf. Problem Pcsticides, Pcsticidc Problems, IOCU 1987. 
Cf. Loc.cit. 
Toxic Substances Control Act, as Amcndcd. 
Cf. For a comparative analysis of the EEC sixth amcndment and the US TOSCA 
legislation cf. G.B.Wilkinson, Tbc Sixth Amcndment: Toxic Substance Control in the 
EEC, Law and Policy in International Business 12 (1980), 461-501 and R.A. Wyman, 
Control of Toxic Subsianccs: Thc Attcmpt to Harmonizc the Notification 
Requiremenls of the U.S. Toxic Substances Contra! Act and the Europcan 
Community Sixth Amendment, Virginia Journal of International Law 1980, 417-458. 
Although somcwhat outdated they providc a valuablc analysis of both rcgulatory 
schemes. Hclpful: lntcmational Regulations of Toxic Subslanccs, American Society 
of International Law, Procccdings of thc 73rd Annual Meeting, April 26-28, 1979 
Washington, 76 et seq. Fora more rcccnt pcrspcctive, cf. R. Brickmann, Controlling 
Chemicals: the politics of rcgulation in Europc and thc United Siatcs, 1985. 
Cf. E.Rehbindcr/D.Kayscr/H.Klein, Kommemar, Einführung 5 et scq. 
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procedures as a mechanism of shared responsibility, because the 
manufacturer has to notify his intention to manufacture or market a new 
chemical to the competent authority which then takes the necessary decision 
to make sure that the chemicals are adequately tested, classified, labelled 
and packed. This procedure is different in countries where chemicals and 
pesticides are subject to a prior approval procedure. The competent 
authorities have to make a positive decision, an approval, in order to ensure 
that the chemical or pesticide in question is manufactured and marketed. 
2. Chemicals 
A substance-related licensing procedure has been used in Japan68. The 
procedure consists of a screening mechanism which is designed to assess the 
risks associated with a particular substance, and of a subsequent procedure 
of formal control. It determines whether the substance belongs to the 
category of "specified chemical substances", i.e .. if the substance is 
persistent, tends to accumulate in living organisms and has toxic properties. 
The majority of licensing schemes provided in the various chemical laws 
have a much more limited scope and purpose. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand and Switzerland a 
licensing procedure has been introduced as a control device for the 
manufacturer and/or sale and use (in the case of New Zealand only for the 
sale) of individual, particularly hazardous substances. A general substance-
related control of chemicals is not intended in these countnes69. 
The purpose of the licensing procedures provided for in the 
Netherlands and in the United Kingdom seems to be broader and would 
allow the introduction of a substance-related control. Under the Dutch 
chemical regulation a competent agency is authorized to deny a permit, 
where it is considered necessary to protect man and the environment. lt has 
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Cf. UNEP, informal Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the amcndcd 
London Guidclines, Geneva, 2-3 April 1990, Review of Environmental Activities 
rclated to thc production and use of chemicals, UNEP/PIC.CONS.1/4. 
Cf. OECD Comparativc Analysis No.23; UNEP Comparativc Survcy, No. SO. 
Cf. UNEP Comparativc Survey, No. 48. 
been disputed whether the 6th Amendrnent of the directive on dangerous 
substances of the European Community provides for the opportunity to 
introduce such a license scheme. With respect to manufacture and use, the 
member states are not bound by the directive as long as the procedure is not 
seen as a disguised attempt to control the placing of substances on the 
market that have already been notified under the directive and thus can be 
freely sold in the Community. A licensing procedure that protects against 
specific risks of manufacture seems permissible70. 
But a licensing procedure in the area of chemical regulation is much 
more the exemption than the rule in the industrialized countries. The widest-
spread attempt of introducing pre-market control in the area of chemicals is 
based on the idea that a notification procedure suffices to guarantee the 
protection of man and the environment. This is particularly true for the 
member states of the European Community, but also for the EFTA countries 
and the United States. When analyzing the implementation of the 6th 
Amendment in member state legislation, differences have emerged, which 
might be significant in the context of the European integration process 71. 
But in an international perspective it is much more important to stress the 
relative harmony between most industrialized countries with respect to the 
necessary limitation of pre-market control notification procedures. 
The history of this international process of harmonizing chemical 
regulation illuminates the incentives for the development of an international 
model for chemicals control. Since the early '70s, a number of industrialized 
countries habe been discussing the necessity of adopting chemical 
regulations. ln Europe, France set the European legislative machinery into 
motion by notifying the Community of its intentions to adopt chemical 
legislation 72_ On the other side of the ocean, the United States were already 
in the process of preparing specific chemical-related Jegislation. Both 
initiatives were pooled within the OECD. The OECD and the EEC, both 
70 
71 
Cf. UNEP Comparativc Survcry, No. 49. 
Cf. The study of E. Rchbindcr, Chcmikalicnrccht, loc.cit. 
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international organizations, both grouping highly industrialized countries, 
initiated an intensive period of cooperation to guarantee that a harrnonized 
approach of regulation within the most industrialized countries would 
prevent the emergence of new technical barriers to trade. One might even 
conclude that these intra-supranational initiatives of OECD and EEC were 
quite successful. At least, there is no evidence that the still-remaining 
disparities between the EEC and the United States regulation on the control 
of chemicals have led to problems in international trade. 
The similarities between the legislative effort of industrialized 
countries to control chemicals do not cancel out quite a number of important 
differences73_ In the United States. manufacturers have to notify the 
competent agencies prior to manufacture of the new chemical. 
Under the 6th Arnendment, notification is only necessary prior to the 
marketing of the newly manufactured chemical. This difference is not 
important only for deciding to what extent member states are still allowed to 
introduce licensing procedures relating to the manufacture and use of 
specific highly dangerous chemical substances. The difference between 
premanufacturing and pre-marketing notification is above all important for 
the conditions under which chemicals which are not notified, might be 
exported to countries outside the Community or outside the United States. 
Pre-manufacturing notification excludes such an opportunity in principle. 
Pre-marketing notification allows manufacturers to produce chemicals 
without notifying them to the competent authorities if they are able to 
demonstrate that these chemicals have been produced for export only. 
Many more difficulties in the negotiations between OECD and EEC 
resulted from the notice procedure in the United States and the notification 
procedure under the 6th Amendmem74_ Section 5 of the TSC.A. requires 
premanufacturing notice and testing requirements for new substances and 
substances which are subject to significant "new uses''. The 6th Amendment 
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Cf. G.B. Wilkinson, loc.cit. 471. 
Cf. G.B. Wilkinson, loc.cit. 495; R.A. Wyman, loc.cit. 442 et scq. 
provides for elaborate notification documents including testing results. 
Unlike TSCA section 5, which confers no competence on the Environmental 
Protection Agency to compel manufacturers to conduct testing, the 6th 
Amendment establishes a mandatory testing scheme for all new chemicals. 
In the European Community the responsibility rests upon the manufacturer 
to judge the possible risk of the notified chemical, in the United States 
responsibility lies with the competent Environmental Protection Agency that 
is in charge of reviewing the notice and requesting additional information if 
necessary for the risk assessment. The different approaches between 
mandatory testing combined with the manufacturers' responsibility to assess 
the testing result versus mere paper notice in conjunction with a statutory 
risk assessment had led to a situation where the testing disparities have 
become the crucial areas of concem in the dialogue between the OECD and 
the EEC. 
The EEC 6th Amendment pleaded for a unique mandatory test 
screening, valid for all types of chemicals, whereas the United States' 
approach focused on the possible toxicity of the product. The differences in 
the test philosophy reflect the differences in risk assessment. The EEC has 
chosen a quantity triggering mechanism, where chemicals are subject to a 
basic test, supplemented by an additional test if a certain production quantity 
is superseded. The United States risk assessment procedure is less rigid and 
less predictable, because it focuses on the toxicity of the chemical 
substances alone. 
Here the OECD stepped in and tried to develop a common frame for 
the testing procedure75. Two recommendations, the Guidelines for Testing 
of Chemicals, adopted in 1982, and the Good Laboratory Practice in the 
Testing of Chemicals, 1982 had been of considerable importance in bringing 
together the different approaches. The Guidelines for Testing of Chemicals 
formulate a minimum set of testing, which makes the European mandatory 
testing scheme compatible with the American optional testing in case of 
74 Cf. G.B. Wilkinson, loc.cit. 489; R.A. Wyman, loc.cit. 443 et scq. 
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presumed toxicity. The EPA used the international forum at the OECD level 
to push the development of minimum testing requirements, although it had 
no competence under TSCA to adopt such minimum mandatory Standards 
for testing76_ American manufacturers were supporting EPA in the early 
'80s in order tobe sure of what might be expected by EPA in assessing the 
information provided together with the notice77. They were willing to 
acccpt the existence of a basic testing set for the reason of greater 
"Rechtssicherheit". European manufacturers on the other hand had to 
swallow common Guidelines on Good Laboratory Practice in the testing of 
chemicals. Most of the member states of the European Community are 
making reference in their national legislation to the OECD Guidelines in 
one form _or another78. The Guidelines are not directly integrated into the 
laws and are not mandatory in strictly legal terms, but they seem to play a 
major role in present practice. 
There is no equivalent pre-market control legislation whatsoever on 
the international floor. The Ad Hoc Meeting of Senior Government Official 
Experts in Environmental Law, Montevideo 1982, adopted a program for 
the development and periodic review of environmental iaw 79. It concluded 
that the international trade in potentially harmful chemicals 
calls for action. B ut this mandate has not yet been realized so far. 
3. Pesticides 
Most industrialized countries require the registration of a pesticide 
prior to its circulation on the market either by authority of special pesticide 
laws or general chemical laws80. The registration procedure in substancc is 
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Cf. G.B. Wilkinson, loc.cit 497 et scq. 
Cf. Thc vcry dciailcd prescntation of the OECD policy M.C. Bracken, in 
International Regulation ofToxic Substances, loc.cil. 88 et scq; cf. mor El'A's rolc in 
OECD ncgotiations, R. Brickmann, loc.cit. 298. 
Cf. G.B. Wilkinson, loc.cit 489, 490. 
Cf. Rcfcrcnccs in E. Rchbindcr, Chemikalienrecht, loc.cit. 
Montevideo Programme for thc Dcvelopment and Periodic Review of Environmcntal 
Law, Ad Hoc Meeting of Senior Govemmcnt Officials Expert in Environmental Law, 
a substance-related licensing procedure. Many countries call it "prior 
approval procedure" thereby underscoring that the pesticides can be 
marketed only if the competent authority has positively approved the safety 
of the pesticide ( e.g. Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Switzerland). The same type of prior approval procedure is commonly 
accepted in the field of medicines81. Grosso modo, he who intends to 
manufacture and market a new pesticide has to undertake a series of tests, 
the results of which have to be presented to a competent agency who is in 
charge of assessing the results. He must also initiale, if necessary, additional 
testing and decide whether, under what conditions, and for what purpose the 
pesticide might be put on the marke182. 
The normal prerequisites for approval are that the pesticide is 
sufficently effective and suitable and does not present unreasonable risks to 
man, animals or the environment (Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Netherlands, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, United States)83. The integration 
of environmental protection into the licensing procedure is relatively new. 
The main objective is still to guarantee the protection of man; environmental 
protection does not benefit from the same status. Countries tend to make a 
two-pronged approach, thereby ranking the protection of the environment 
behind the protection of health and safety (Federal Republic of Germany). 
Sometimes there are additional prerequisites related to the producer or 
methods of production. In the United Kingdom, there has been a voluntary 
certification scheme under a joint industry - government agreement 
(Pesticide Safety Precaution Scheme) by virtue of which, basically, the sarne 
kind of assessment is undertaken. Such a voluntary arrangement has 
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Montevideo, 6 November 1981; Decision 10/21 of thc Goveming Council of UNEP, 
of31 May 1982. 
Cf. For a comparative analysis K. Bossclmann, Recht der Gcfahrstoffe, 
Rechtsverglcichender Überblick, 1987; Ch. Urnm, International Regulation of the 
Safe and Use of Pesticides, Northwestcrn Journal of International Law and Business, 
10 (1990), 460 et scq. 
Cf. For a recent analysis in the Europcan contcxt, D.Hart/N.Reich, Integration und 
Recht des Arzneimittelmarktes in der EG, ZERP Schriftenreihe, Band 13, 1990. 
Cf. UNEP Comparative Survey, No. 52. 
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preceded the 1968 introduction of the prior approval procedure in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. But in 1986 the UK joined the majority of the 
industrialised countries and inserted a prior approval procedure in its 
pesticide legislation. 
At the European level, pre-market control of pesticides has never 
reached the same degree of public and political attention as pre-market 
control of chemicals. The Commission of the European Community had 
already presented in 1976 a proposal for the establishment of a European-
wide prior approval procedure84. The draft was meant to supplement 
Directive 78/63 J 85 on the classification, labelling and packaging of 
pesticides but did not get support from the Council. The White Paper on the 
Completion of the Interna! Market by 1992 gave a new impetus to the 
harmonization of pre-market control in the European Community86. 
In 1989 the Commission came out with a new completely revised 
draft87. It provides for a two-tier system, distinguishing between the 
registration of "active substances" and the prior approval of "preparations". 
Prior approval of preparations (pesticide products) should be Jeft to the 
member states. The memher states, however, could approve only those 
preparations whose "active substances" appear on a so-called "positive !ist". 
Art. 5 states that an active substance shall be includt:d on the !ist for an 
initial period not exceeding ten years only if 
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(a) its residues in edible plant products, edible livestock 
products or the environment, consequent to an application 
consistent with good agricultural practise do not have any 
harmful effects on human or animal health or any 
unacceptable effects on the environment, and the said 
Cf. UNEP Comparativc Survcy, No. 52. 
Cf. 01C212, 9.9.1976, 3 et scq. 
Cf. Loc.cit. 
Cf. COM (85) 310 final, 14.6.1985. 
Cf. 01 No. C 89, 10.4.1989, 22 et scq. 
residues can be measured by appropriate methods. These 
conditions shall be deemed satisfactory if it is possible to 
set a daily absorption quantity tolerable by man, 
(b) it may be expected, on the basis of scientific and 
technical data, that use of the active substance by means 
of pharmaceutical products manufactured from it will 
meet the requirements of the member states prior approval 
procedure. Compliance with these conditions may be 
assessed by setting whenever possible, a maximum 
tolerance exposure value for users of such plant protection 
products, and by means of criteria for assessing the effects 
on the environment, such as the biodegradability, mobility 
and accumulative capacity of the substance. 
The draft does not yet contain a !ist of active substances. lt should be 
drawn up later by the Commission's Standing Committee on Plant 
Protection. Prior approval of preparations by the member states require a 
listing of the active substances at the Community level and if 
(b) it is established that, in the light of the current 
scientific and technical knowledge, when properly applied 
for the purpose intended, and having regard to all normal 
conditions under which it may be used: 
(i) it is sufficently effective 
(ii) it has no unacceptable effect on plants or plant 
products, 
(iii) it has no harmful effect on human or animal health, 
(iv) it has no unacceptable influence on the environment. 
(c) the nature and quantity of its active substances and, 
where appropriate, any significant impurities, can be 
determined by appropriate methods in general use, 
(d) its physical and chemical properties have been 
determined and deemed acceptable for purposes of the 
appropriate use and storage of the product. 
Once a pesticide is registered by one member state, all the other states 
would have to allow their marketing as weil. A ham10nized Community 
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procedure for national registration is still lacking. Again, a future definition 
of this procedure should be left to the Standing Committee of Plant 
Protection. 
The draft has raised much criticism by member scates with a high level 
of protection, as weil as by environmental activists88. The draft is said to 
promote the free flow of pesticides and to set aside the necessity of 
protecting the environment effectively. The prerequisites for listing active 
substances require that there are no "unacceptable effects on the 
environment", the prior registration of the preparations requires that there is 
no "unacceptable influence on the environment". These standards have been 
accused of not keeping up with existing standards of industrialized countries 
where mere effects on the environment have to be considered in the risk 
assessment, and not only "harrnful" or "unacceptable" effects89. Another 
point of critique is the lack of clear criteria for the listing of the active 
substances and the prior approval of preparations. The task would again be 
left to a Committee without any parliamentary and public control. The lack 
of common criteria combined with the obligation of mutual recognition 
(Art. 10) means that pesticides could enter the Interna! Market through the 
country with the lowest registration standards. Therefore, a mechanism 
exists that would allow pesticides already banned in some member states to 
retum on the market in those states. The extensive involvement of FAO in 
developing common registration standards might contribute to harmonizing 
the registration procedure even in the European Community. 
The FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides 
requires governments in Art. 5 under the heading "Reducing health 
hazards", which have not yet done so, to "implement a pesticide registration 
and control scheme". Art. 6 states: 
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Governments should take action to introduce the 
necessary legislation for the regulation, including 
registration of pesticides, and makc provisions for its 
effective enforcement, including the establishment of 
appropriate educational advisory, extension and health-
care services. The Guidelines for the registration and 
control of pesticides should be followed as far as possible, 
taking full account of local needs, social and economic 
conditions, levels of literacy, climatic conditions and the 
availability of pesticide application equipment. 
The FAQ Code formulates the surrounding conditions of pre-market 
control rather than the procedure itself. The latter is speit out in the FAQ 
Guidelines on the Registration and Control of Pesticides90. The Code itself 
manifests the autonomy of the nation states to decide on the admissibility 
criteria for the marketing of a pesticide. Reference is made to the different 
climate, the different economic resources and implicitly to the different 
possibilities of securing the safety of those who apply the pesticides91. 
The Guidelines for the Registration and Control is meant to present a 
model scheme for the registration procedure. As this scheme turned out to 
be too sophisticated for countries lacking the necessary infrastructure, FAQ 
is preparing Guidelines on the Initial Introduction of a Simple National 
Pesticide Registration and Control Scheme. Testing requirements are laid 
down in the Guidelines on Environmental Criteria for the Registration of 
Pesticides92, presently under revision. The Guidelines on Good Laboratory 
Practices define minimum standards for the execution of testing93. There are 
another 10 guidelines already published, under revision or under 
consideration which may lead to the conclusion that the FAQ fulfills the 
same role in the development of common testing rules on the international 
90 
91 
92 
Guidelines for thc rcgistration and control of pcsticidcs (including a modcl scheme 
for the establishmcnt of national organisations), FAO 1985; Addenda to the 
guidclincs for thc rcgistration and control of pcsticidcs, FAO J 988. 
Thc Code has bccn blamed for lcgilimising "double standards"; cf. Problem 
Pesticidcs, Pesticid~ Problems, 1987. 
FAO 1985. 
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trade in pesticides as the OECD in the international regulation of chemicals. 
Industrialized countries have pooled their interest in chemical regulation 
within OECD, a forum, which Third World countries have no access to. 
FAQ is open to all nation states, developing countries may bring their 
influence to bear. But it is primarily an organisation dealing with food and 
agriculture and not with health, safety or environmental protection. lt has, 
however, seriously begun to consider these objectives in the seventies. This 
might explain, why FAQ is seen as the appropriate forum of international 
coordination and cooperation. 
IV. Post market control of "old" substances and "old" pesticides 
Post market control mechanisms cover two different areas of concern: 
First, regulatory mechanisms have to be found fcr the handling of risks 
resulting from chemicals and pesticides which were brought into circulation 
before pre-market control legislation was adopted. Second, measures are 
now needed to withdraw from the market or even to ban the production of 
products, which were legally brought into circulation under existing pre-
market control mechanisms, but which then turned out to be dangerous. At 
an injuncture, where there is no common denominator on pre-market control 
mechanisms of pesticides and chemicals in sight, it might sound strange to 
put emphasis on post market control mechanisms at the international level. 
Public attention, however, is increasingly focused on the risk of those 
chemicals and pesticides which are legally manufactured and legally 
marketed all over the world, but nevertheless constitute risks. The lesson to 
be learned is that existing pre-market control mechanisms cannot guarentee 
that long-term hazards will not emerge. 
1. C oncept of post market control 
Post market control of old chemicals and old pesticides is exercised in 
a three-step procedure. A competent regulatory authority must first make the 
concept of safety operable for the performance of post market control 
93 
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Thc FAO Code of Conduct, loc.cit. expliclily rcfcrs to thc OECD Guidclincs which 
havc prcparcd for thc tcsting of chcmicals but cxpandcd thcn to pcsticidcs, 33 Note 4. 
mechanisms. It has then to investigate the arising dangers from chemicals 
and pesticides, before it enters into the decision-making process. Although 
regulatory concepts all over the world create more problems than they 
pretend to solve in distinguishing more and more sophisticated degrees of 
dangers, there seems to be a commonly accepted difference in chemicals 
and pesticides legislation in so far as pre-market control relates to the 
potential hazards of chemicals and pesticides, whereas post market control 
relates to suspected and known risks94. The "definition of risk" is the 
starting point for the "investigation of the <langer". Competent regulatory 
bodies can only take post market control action if they get the necessary 
information on risks to man and the environment. Once the information is 
available, the competent authorities have to enter into the decision-making 
process. Modem chemical Jaws and pesticide laws provide for a whole set of 
regulatory instruments to fight possible dangers95. 
Although post market control in industrialized countries is a relatively 
new regulatory field, some common trends are already becoming clear. 
There is an overall tendency on confer the performance of post market 
control mechanisms on those statutory competent authorities, which are 
already responsible for pre-market control. These competent authorities 
have gained substantial power. They benefit from the uncertainties in 
defining risks, from comprehensive mandates in investigating dangers and 
from discretion in taking the appropriate measures96. This tendency might 
be somewhat counterbalanced by splitting competences. Industrialized 
countries tend, indeed, to establish competent authorities for each single 
category of products, one agency for chemicals, another agency for 
pesticides. If competence is brought under the very same umbrella 
organisation, separated divisions on chemicals and pesticides are usually set 
up, as in the case of the United States Environmental Protection Agency. 
There is an important difference in the regulatory philosophy between 
94 
95 
96 
Cf. Tenninology in OECD Comparative Report, loc.cit. No. 10 et seq. 
Cf. OECD Comparativc Analysis, Table 4 on page 21. 
G. Majone, Cross-National Sources of Rcgulalory Policy-Making in Europe and the 
United States, to appcar in Journal of Public Policy, Spring 1991. 
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European competent authorities and the United States authorities. Although 
US and European governments have addressed the problem of chemical and 
pesticide control at roughly the same times and have assumed similar 
responsibilities, they have developed markedly different procedures for 
reaching regulatory decisions97. Two distinct patterns emerged98: 
"American regulatory processes stand apart with the complexity of their 
procedures, the heavy reliance on formal analysis of risks and benefits, the 
openness of administrative decision-making and the active supervision of 
executive agencies by Congress and the courts. European processes, despite 
some notable differences among them, share simpler administrative 
procedures, greater informality in the analysis of evidence, less complete 
public access to decision-makers; and relatively little oversight by 
parliament or the courts. Yet. on the other hand, one of the most striking 
conclusions seems to be that these contrasting methods of decision-making 
have led to remarkably similar policy choices. particularly in the selection of 
specific chemicals as targets of regulation". 
Access to information plays a key role in the execution of 
post market control mechanisms. The '80s have demomtrated the growing 
power of national and intemationally operating non-govemmental 
organizations in bringing risks of chemicals ;;nd pesticides to the public's 
attention and in pushing regulatory agencies into action. Effective post 
market control requires that information on even potential risks of chemicals 
and pesticides which are manufactured and marketed world-wide should be 
made public as early as possible. Access to information, however, has to be 
weighed against legitimate interests of manufacturers to protect data on 
chemicals and pesticides for reasons of intellectual property. The 
industrialized countries have not yet come to a common solution. The 
United States TSCA obliges manufacturers to make all those data on 
chemicals publicly available which are related to health, safety and 
environmental protection99. The 6th Amendment has chosen a much more 
97 
98 
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Cf. R.Brickmann, loc.cit. 23. 
Cf. More or lcss litcrally takcn from, R.Brickmann, Ioc.cil. 23 et scq. 
restrictive approach. These data are not made available to the public since 
manufacturers may require their confidentiality. The OECD has tried to 
harmonize differences between the United States and the European 
Community. Two guidelines on the confidentiality of data protection have 
been developed. lt has never been investigated to what extent European 
manufacturers and American manufacturers have come to a solution with 
regard to harmonizing the differences. But as far as we know, problems 
have not arisen, although mainly European manufacturers had feared the 
liberal approach of the United States to data protection. Even within the 
European Community, the policy seems to have changed as the newly 
adopted Directive on Freedom to Information indicates 100. 
Whatever solutions found among the industrialized countries to 
balance out conflicting interests of the public at !arge in having early access 
to potential hazards of chemicals and pesticides, and of the legitimate 
interests of manufacturers to, quite on the contrary, protect these data, there 
is much pressure for international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations as watch-dogs of the international trade in chemicals and 
pesticides to establish their own data collection systems 101. But these data 
systems can never reach the same level and quality of information systems 
erected within multinational enterprises or collected in competent authorities 
in the main chemical and pesticide producing countries. International 
information systems which do not distinguish between confidential and non-
confidential data on potential risks of chemicals and pesticides and which 
guarantee access to information, run the risk of stocking only the "second 
best" data. 
99 Cf. G.B. Wilkinson, loc.cit. 483, morc comprchcnsivcly, R.B. Wyman, \oc.cit. 451 et 
scq. 
100 OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, 56 et scq.; cf. G. Winter (Hrsg.) Öffentlichkeit von 
Umweltinformationen, Europäische und nordamerikanische Rc~hte und Erfahrungen, 
Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Europäische Rechtspolitik Band 12, 1990. 
101 Cf. Y.Dom7.alski, Les Interpols des Associalions de Consommateurs, BEUC/113/84, 
1984. 
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2. Information collection and information exchange 
At the national level, highly sophisticated regulatory systems have 
been developed in the EEC, the EFf A countries and the United States. 
Despite considerable differences in detail, there seems to be an 
interrelationship between the density of pre-market control and the state of 
post market control. To put it the other way round: in countries where there 
is a well-developed system on pre-market control of pesticides, as in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, post market control is developed to a lesser 
degree. Quite the opposite is true for technical consumer goods. These 
goods are usually not subject to any kind of statutory pre-market control, but 
highly sophisticated systems exist to withdraw unsafe technical consumer 
goods from the market 102. Well-developed data collection is based on 
accident surveillance systems, on notification duties of manufacturers, 
suppliers and importers and of mechanisms 10 guarantee that informal 
information coming from individuals or organizations is dealt with in an 
appropriate way. The overall intention of all these mechanisms is to 
guarantee that the competent authority is brought into a position where it is 
posssible to assess the reported risks under the legal requirements. 
At the EEC level a sophisticated system of information collection and 
information exchange is operating only in tht area of technical consumer 
goods. Here, the so-called Rapid Exchange System, Council Regulation 
84/133103, provides for a mechanism under which formal and informal 
regulatory actions of competent member states' authorities have to be 
reported to the Commission, which guarantees the exchange of information 
with all the other member states. The Draft Directive on Product Safety 
90/C 156/07104 even tries to establish a mechanism under which the 
102 Cf. Ch.Jocrges/J.Falke/H.-W.Micklirz/G.Brüggcmeicr, Die Sichc1hcit von 
Konsumgütern und die Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 
Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Europäische RcchLspolitik, Band 2 J 988; now 
available also in Englisch EU! Working Papers in Law, No. 91110 - 91/14 (5 
Volumcs). 
103 OJ L 70, 13.3.1984, 16 et scq.; for a critical revicw, cf. J.Falkc, What should bc the 
Contcnt of an E.E.C. General Directive an the Safety of Technical Consumcr Goods, 
BEUC Legal News No. 16 (Nov./Dcc. 1986), 16 et seq. 
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Commission itself is able to take action at the Community level in 
emergency situations. 
There is no equivalent to be found for controlling chemicals and 
pesticides at the EEC level. There is no mechanism obliging member states 
to exchange information with the Commission and the other member states 
on possible risks resulting from unsafe chemicals or pesticides. At the 
present time, the consultative committees constituted under the respective 
directives being composed of representatives of member states and the 
Commission, guarantee that an informal exchange of information can take 
place. But these committees are working behind closed doors; neither public 
interest groups nor manufacturers have been offcially granted access to the 
committees. And the committees themselves are under no consecutive duty 
to report on their activities 105_ 
The situation is different in cases where member states want to take 
action to prohibit or restrict the marketing of chemicals or pesticides which 
do comply with already accepted European standards. Here, the directives 
provide for a so-called safeguard procedure under which member states 
have to notify their intention to take action to the Commission who, in turn, 
initiates a procedure where a common position at the European level should 
be found. But to repeat it bluntly: there is no legal obligation to come to a 
joint solution. The Community has no power to take action if one member 
state legitimately prohibits the import of certain unsafe chemicals or 
pesticides for heath, safety and environmental protection reasons. This 
mechanism which has been established under the 6th Amendment might be 
chosen in the Draft Directive 89/C 89/02106 on pesticides, too. 
Information collection and infom1ation exchange on posssible 
risks resulting from dangerous pesticides and chemicals and of regulatory 
104 OJ C 156, 27.6.1990, 8 et scq. 
105 H.Bentlagc, An advisory board for consumcr product safcty: Thc Gcrman expcrience 
- Europcan perspectives, Zentrum für Europäische Recht~politik, Studie im Auftrag 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, V crtrags-Nummcr 6674/89/15, November 1990. 
37 
action of nation states taken to mitigate these very risks constitute one of the 
predominant areas of concem for international organizations 107. UN 
organisations concentrate their efforts related to toxic chemicals on the 
collection, evaluation and dissemination of information on chemical risks. 
The environmental health criteria program, for example, compiles and 
analyzes the available information on the health effects of a limited number 
of selected pollutants. These evaluations are published in a series of reports, 
some of which conclude even with regulatory recommendations. WHO has 
established a similar programme on work place hazards 108. 
Two UN programmes focus more on d1ssemination of information 
than on evaluation. The International Register of Potentially Toxic 
Chemicals IRPTC is charged with developing an international data bank on 
toxic chemicals, particularly common agrochemicals. ILO publishes 
bibliographies and an encyclopedia of occupational health and safety, both 
of which contain information on chemical hazards. The international 
programme on chemica! safety (IPCS), an effort co-sponsored by WHO, 
ILO and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has been 
set up to register national institutions and support agencies in a coordinated 
program of new research on specific hazardsl09. 
In contrast to the programmes of the European Community or even 
the OECD, these efforts of the UN organisations in the area of toxic 
substances control seem rather fragrnented and even duplicative. They 
intend to achieve, however, what is undoubtedly their principal purpose and 
value: to render service to those countries that lack an indigenous capability 
and evaluate the world literature on chemical hazards. In fulfilling these 
functions, the UN agencies help to extend the benefits of scientific 
106 Cf. Ioc.cit. 
107 Cf. R. Brickmann, loc.cit. 291 et seq. 
108 Cf. Fora comprehensive overview, OECD 1982, Report of thc Expert Group on 
Information Exchange related to Export of Hazardous Chcmicals. 
109 Cf. Ph. Alston, Ioc.ciL 410 et scq. 
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information and increased sophistication in controlling risks to less 
advantaged regions of the wor!d 110. 
From inforrnation collection on toxic chemicals risk, mechanisms 
have to be distinguished aiming at the collection of regulatory 
action. lt is right here where the international organizations have 
demonstrated their willingness and their involvement to play a key role. The 
emergence of inforrnation collection and information exchange in the field 
of regulatory action restricting or banning chemicals and pesticides is 
closely related to the discussion on international efforts to regulate the 
export and import of severely restricted and banned chemicals and 
pesticides 111. 
The OECD is playing a lead role in the management of risks resulting 
from old chemicals and old pesticides being produced and 
marketed long before the developed mechanisms of pre-market control in 
the industrialized world took hold to grip. The OECD, supported by the 
main chemical producing countries all over the world, is trying to develop a 
program on what to do with these old chernicals and pesticides. As yet, there 
is no comrnon methodological concept for selecting these old substances. 
Different criteria are under discussion, resulting from the divergent 
experience within the key competent authorities. The German Federal 
Environrnental Agency, for instance, composed of representatives of the 
chemical industry, the cornpetent authorities and science, pleads for a multi-
step procedure. Frorn the original !ist of 4554 substances, only 60 remain to 
be further examined. The parallel to the late '70s when the introduction of 
pre-market control rnechanisms on chemicals was discussed in Europe and 
in the United States is striking. Once more, it might be necessary to find a 
common denominator in order to evaluate the 100.000 chemical substances 
and to decide which require the highest degree of public attention 112. A first 
110 
111 
112 
Cf. R. Brickmann, loc.cit. 291 et scq. 
Cf. Supra B V. 
Cf. OECD's Work on Invcstigalion of High Production Volumc Chcmicals, 
International Environment Reporter, Junc 1990, 263 cl scq. 
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step in that direction might follow from a recent EEC initiative which 
translates the OECD programme into an EEC legislationl 13 
3. Rules to ban or restrict the production, marketing and use of 
unsafe chemicals and pesticides 
Decision-making and decision-taking to ban or restrict unsafe 
chemicals and pesticides entails a complicated procedure of weighing 
interests. This procedure takes place at the national level. The nation states 
define the set of instruments and chose the regulatory form under which the 
action is taken. In the FRG and Japan, partial bans or restrictions of 
chemicals are taken by way of a regulation. Most of the countries confer the 
competence to regulate the marketing of chemicals to the authority being in 
charge of the pre-market control procedure. 
There are considerable differences in the set of instruments available 
to take action. The OECD Report gives an overview in form of a set of 
tables, linking the trigger mechanism to the selection of control action 114. lt 
should be noted, however, that most of the industrialized countries provide 
for the possibility not only to restrict or ban the marketing of unsafe 
chemicals but also to intervene in the production process itself and to 
prohibit the manufacture of dangerous chemicals. 
Member states of the European Community are still responsible for 
restricting or banning the manufacture, use and marketing of unsafe 
chemicals and pesticides. There is not yet an agreement, not even with a 
view to completing the Interna! Market, to manage post market control at 
the European level. The two directives to ban and restrict unsafe chemicals, 
Directive 76n69115 and to regulate unsafe pesticides 79/l J 7116 provide for 
a regulatory frame which could be regarded as the entrant to a European 
l l3 Cf. OJ C No 276, 5.11.1990, l et scq; thcrcto H.-W.Micklitz, Organisational 
Structures, loc.cit. 
114 Cf. OECD Comparativc Report, Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
115 OJ L 262, 27.9.1976, 201 et seq. 
40 
post market control management. The adoption of a ban or a restriction, 
however, entails the setting into motion of the complicated and lengthy 
agreement procedure within the European Community. lt is not the 
Commission, as the executive organ of the Community, who is taking the 
decision but it the Council as the "legislative" organ. Agreements are often 
reached at the lowest common denominator and measures adopted after a 
considerable delay. lt is not surprising that there is little harmony within the 
Community as regards which particular chemicals and pesticides are to be 
restricted or bannect117. The example of pentachlorphenol, where the 
Federal Republic of Germany decided to adopt a product ban after having 
informed the Commission and having waited more than one year for a joint 
approach, might illustrate the difficulties 118. 
At the international, level banning or restricting the production, use 
and marketing of unsafe chemicals and pesticides requires an agreement in 
the competent international organizations either to issue a recommendation 
or to develop a binding convention. There are only a few examples so far 
where a world-wide agreement is being considered to regulate unsafe 
chemicals and pesticides. Reference can be made to the OECD 
recommendation to ban PCB 119 and the most recent Montreal protocol to 
reduce the production ofthe ozon layer120. 
International organizations had to develop more flexible systems 
which compensate for their Jack of regulatory competence. One very weil 
known but highly controversial mechanism to initiale world-wide banning 
and restricting of unsafe chemicals and pesticides constitutes the adoption of 
116 OJ L 33, 8.2.1979, 36 et seq. 
117 Cf. For an overvicw on thc proposals undcr discussion H.-W.Micklitz, Organisational 
Structures of Product Safety Regulation in B.Staudcr (cd.) La sccuritc des bicns de 
consommation, intcgration curopecnnc et consommation suissc, forthcoming. 
118 BGBL. Teil 1, 22.12.1989, 2235 et scq. 
119 Cf. OECD Council Dccision, Protection of the Environment by Control of 
Polychlorinatcd Biphenyls (Feb. 13, 1987), for further details, cf. Ph. Alston, loc.cit. 
423. et seq. Refcrences in the OECD Chcmicals Programme, 1984. 
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the UN Consolidated List which has most recently appeared in its third 
edition121. This !ist compiles information ofregulatory actions on chemicals 
and pesticides in order to show, mainly to developing countries, what kind 
of actions are taken in the industrialized countries to fight against unsafe 
chemicals and pesticides. The Consolidated List does not produce legally 
binding effects, but it may unfold a moral effect in so far as the products 
being on the !ist are morally blamed and difficult to market worldwide. The 
!ist may initiate regulatory action in developing countries and be made 
instrumental by non-govemmental organizations to fight against the trade in 
pesticides and chemicals where the risk to man and the environment is weil 
known, like for instance the Dirty Dozen Campaign of the Pesticides Action 
Network (PAN). 
V. Regulation on the export and import of banned and severely 
restricted chemicals and pesticides 
There are quite a number of national and international rules on the 
export and import of banned and severely restricted chemicals and 
pesticides which have to be taken into consideration. Under a national 
perspective, once more, efforts from the United States mainly during the late 
'70s and the early '80s in regulating the export of pesticides and chemicals in 
the respective legislations have to be mentionect 122. Under a regional 
perspective, reference should be made to the Council Regulation No 
1734/88123 conceming the export from and import into the Community of 
l 20 Protocole de Montreal rclalif il des substances qui apprauvisscnt la couchc d'ozonc, 
Acte Final 1987. 
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Cf. Analysis in H.-W.Micklitz, Export of dangerous phannaceuticals to third world 
countrics, ZERP-DP 5/87. 
Cf. Still lhc lcading article, F.Schulberg, United States Expon of Producls Banncd for 
Domestic Usc'", Harvard International Law Journal 20 (1979), 331-383; in an 
international pcrspcctive M.Pallcmaens, Diplomacy and Double Standards, Tue 
Regulation of International Trade in Pesticides, Master Thesis Harvard Law School, 
May 1985 unpublished manuscripl; E.Rchbinder, Export von 
Schädlingsbekämpfungsmaßnahmen: Gemeinsame Verantwonung von Expon- und 
Importstaat? in Jahrbuch des Umwelt und Technikrechts 1988, UTR Band 5 1988, 
337 et seq; L.Gündling, Prior notification and consultation, in G .Handl/R.E.Luu, 
Transferring Ha7.ardous Tcchnologics and Substanccs - The International Challcngc, 
1989, 63 Cl seq. 
certain dangerous chemicals. But national and regional efforts to regulate 
the export issue lag behind the overwhelming interests of international 
organizations in pushing for some form of harmonized regulation on the 
export and import of banned and severely restricted chemcials and 
pesticides. Most notably, reference should be made to the: 
OECD Recommendation C (84) 37 Information Exchange related to 
Export of Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals, 1984; 
OECD Guiding Principles on Information Exchange related to Export 
of Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals, 1984; 
UNEP amended London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information 
on Chemicals in International Trade, 1989; 
the FAQ International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of 
Pesticides, 1986, as amended in 1989; 
the UNEP Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
ofHazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989. 
1. Concept, definition and role of international organisations 
Export and import of banned and severely restricted chemicals and 
pesticides has become and still is an international issue. The very first 
initiative to develop international rules notably within the OECD 
derives from the Unites States' policy in the late '70s and early '80s to 
regulate the export and import under a human rights perspectivel24. But 
national efforts to get a grip on the export/import issue slackened down and 
have more or less been substituted by attempts of different international 
regulations in finding some form of harmonized procedure. Differing 
approaches of the industrialized nations to regulate the export of banned and 
severely restricted chemicals and pesticides were seen as a kind of technical 
barrier to trade requiring a process of harmonization on the international 
floor. The interest and the impact of such an understanding, however, is 
123 OJ L 155, 22.6.1988, 2 et scq.; thereto M. Pallemaerts, Export Notification, Tue Draft 
EC Regulation in an International Perspcctive, Europcan Environment Review, Vol. 
1 No. 2, 1987. 
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limited. Tue original intention to come to some form of harmonized 
export/import rules world-wide was to bridge the gap between differences in 
nation states' efforts to protect their citizens and the environment against 
risks resulting from pesticides and chemicals. Nevertheless, differences 
subsist even among industrialized nations, differences which lead to a 
situation where one industrialized country bans or restricts certain pesticides 
or chemicals whereas another still allows the production and marketing of 
the very same chemical and pesticide. But the main impetus for an 
international rule does not derive from these differences between 
industrialized nations. Developing countries who were the primary 
addressee of the imports of banned and severely restricted chemicals and 
pesticides raised their voice already in the late '70s that there were no 
national legislation to protect these countries against exports from banned 
and severely restricted chemicals. So the overall perspective in the early '80s 
has never been to harmonize the international rules on the production, use 
and marketing of chemicals and pesticides. The issues raised in the '70s and 
'80s were to find international rules bridging the gap betwen the differences 
of extensive chemicals and pesticides regulation in industrialized countries 
and the mere Jack of comparable rules in importing countries. One might 
even go so far as to conclude that the original intention was not to regulate 
the trade of banned and severely restricted ch~micals and pesticides but to 
find rules under which the trade with these incriminated categories of 
products should and could be legitimated. 
lt is in this period where the OECD once more played a key role in 
international efforts to get a grip on the export/import issue. The OECD 
adopted already in 1984 its Recommendation on the Information Exchange 
related to Export of Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals, and the 
Guiding Principles. The consensus found within the OECD countries 
determined for a number of years the discussion in the broader forums like 
UNEP and FAO. The regulatory model, based on a clear distinction between 
124 Cf. Hazardous Products from a Human Rights Perspcctivc, 14, (1983) S.W.U.L. Rcv. 
81 et seq.; Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and Uniccd Siaces Foreign 
Policy, 19 (1978) Harv.Int'l.LJ. 813 et seq. 
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information exchange on the one hand and export notification on the other, 
were overcome in the last few years, when under the pressure of developing 
countries supported by non-governmental organizations these regulatory 
models of the OECD were further developed and supplemented by the so-
called PIC procedure. 
The Prior lnformed Consent procedure indicates an important shift in 
the perspecti ve of regulating hazardous, not onl y banned and severel y 
restricted, chemicals and pesticides. These rules might be the starting point 
for the development of international mies on the production, use and 
marketing of chemicals and pesticides. This is true for two reasons: first of 
all, the PIC procedure establishes a mechanism under which it is guaranteed 
that all actions taken by countries to restrict or ban chemicals or pesticides 
can be integrated. Secondly, the rules on classification, labelling and on 
technical assistance integrated within the UNEP amended London 
Guidelines not only back the scope of the more nartow rules on banned and 
severely restricted chemicals and pesticides, but must be understood as an 
effon to lay down world-wide minimum standards, applicable for all 
chemicals and pesticides. Tue Basle Convention providing for PIC has 
considerably facilitated the adoption of the Amended London Guidelines l25. 
Such a perspective of the funher development of the international 
rules on the export of banned and severely restricted pesticides and 
chemicals are considerably strengthened by the fact that GA TI has pul the 
issue on the Uruguay-Round. GA IT had already laid down notification and 
information exchange mechanisms in the early '80s. This effort was more or 
less initiated by the strong engagement by OECD, FAO and UNEP. GAIT 
feit that something should be done and stepped into the fieJd126. The 
125 
126 
Convention on thc Control of Transboundary Movcmcnts of Hazardous Wastcs and 
Their Disposal, Environmental Policy and Law, 19/2 (1989), 68 et seq.; cf. for the 
EEC's committmcnt in implcmenting the convention, proposal 90/C 289 05 OJ C 
289, 17.11.1990, 9 et scq. 
Cf. E.Rehbindcr, Environmenial Protection and thc Law of International Trade (with 
particular reference to thc export of hazardous chemicals and transfrontier disposal of 
wastcs) in: The Future of the International Law of the Environment, Hague Academy 
oflntemational Law I984, R.J.Dupuy 1985, 357 et seq. 
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discussions and negottattons on the rules, however, took place within 
OECD, FAO and UNEP. With the establishment of the working group on 
trade and of domesticly prohibited goods and other hazardous substances, 
the international scenario has changed dramatically. GA TI's involvement 
makes clear that rules are needed at the international floor bringing together 
the original GA TI idea of guaranteeing free trade worldwide with the 
necessity to have international rules protecting health and safety and 
guaranteeing environmental protection. GATI's committment could weil 
constitute the beginning of the development of an international order on 
regulating product safety and environmental protection. 
2. l nformation exchange, export notification and prior informed 
consentprocedure 
The OECD Recommendation on information exchange and the 
Guiding Principles, all adopted in 1984 have introduced a two tier-
procedure, which is still valid and executed worldwide. Tue procedure is 
based on the distinction between the exchange of information on regulatory 
action and the notification of the export which takes place once the export 
occurs. Information exchange simply means that countries which have taken 
action to ban or severely restrict a chemical or pesticide notify the very 
same decision to all member states of the international organizations 
concerned. Such an information exchange should guarantee that the 
designated authorities of the member states cor.cerned are kept abreast on 
what kind of action has been taken within the network. The establishment of 
such an information exchange mechanism entails the necessity to define 
what kind of action should be notified 127: 
"only final action as promoted by the industrialized countries or 
already provisional and intermediary actions, 
a definition of what is to be understood by hazardous chemicals, only 
banned or severely restricted, or at the same time unregistered or 
voluntarily withdrawn, chemicals and pesticides, 
127 Cf. OECD Guiding Principles, 1094 loc.cit. 
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last, but not least, it requires the complicated determination of the 
category "severely restricted". 
The OECD Guiding Principles have taken a narrow approach, 
covering only final actions and limiting the scope to banned and severely 
restricted products by excluding informal activities of manufacturers and the 
"never-registered". lt is an approach which still determines the scope of each 
and every international mechanism currently under discussion. The mere 
information exchange of final regulatory actions of limited product 
categories constituted the original offer by the industrialized countries to 
guarantee some minimum protection to the developing countries. Mere 
information exchange between designated authorities all over the world 
seemed to be quite moderate. But inforrnation exchange gains substantially 
once the information is compiled and filed in a separate document, i.e. the 
Consolidated List 128. 
From the mere information exchange on regulatory actions, the 
export notification has to be clearly distinguished. Export 
notification means that the respective exporter notifies his intention to 
export chemicals or pesticides either to the exporting authorities and/or the 
importing authorities. The OECD Guiding Principles first blocked efforts of 
developing countries to use the export notification as an instrument to 
impede the international trade with chemicals and pesticides by promoting 
the idea of prior inforrned consent. Prior informed conseni in relation to 
export notification would mean that the exporter is obliged to notify his 
intention to export and wait for the consent of the addressee, the importing 
country, before he is allowed to ship the products out. Nurnerous variations 
have been discussed within the last years, ranging from stop shipment 
notification to a much more flexible approach where notification would be 
necessary only once a year. The same is true for the role of exporting and 
importing authorities. Developing countries pushed for a model where 
exporters would be obliged to notify statutory authorities in the exporting 
and importing countries and where the notification is transmitted from one 
128 Cf. Referenccs in M.Pallemaerts, loc.cit. and L.Gündling, loc.cit. 
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statutory authority to the other. Manufacturers on the other hand promoted 
the idea of organizing the export notification between the exporter and the 
importer and of setting aside any engagement of statutory authorities, from 
the exporting as weil as from the importing country. 
The still prevailing export notification mechanism as fostered by the 
OECD Guiding Principles leaves much space for interpretation. lt merely 
states that if the export of a chemical banned or severely restricted in the 
state of export occurs, the state of expon should ensure that necessary steps 
are taken to provide the designated national authority of the state of import 
with relevant infonnation. The purpose of the export notification is in the 
language of OECD and the original London Guidelines "to remind the state 
of the import of the original notification regarding control action 
(information exchange) and to alert it to the fact that an export will occur or 
is occurringl29". There are some minor differences between the OECD 
Guiding Principles, the original UNEP Guidelines and Art. 9 in the FAO 
Code of Conduct. But whatever these differences are, no stop shipment 
notification, not even notification prior to export is mandatory. The role of 
exporters and importers on the one hand and exporting and importing 
authorities on the other is still not clearly defined. There is much space for 
interpretation and variation in shaping the natic»1al model. 
Within that regulatory frame, however, one might conclude that 
information exchange and export notification, as originally promoted by the 
OECD Guiding Principles, has become part of the national regulatory 
systems of most industrialized nations. This is true for the United States, 
where the respective provisions of chemical and pesticides control cover the 
information exchange and notification procedure as provided for under the 
OECD Guiding Principles, and this is also true for the European Community 
where the regulation 1734/88130 makes the international consensus found 
within OECD, UNEP and FAO mandatory. The EEC regulation avoids a 
number of conflicts in the exact shaping of the scope by listing 21 chemicals 
129 Cf. London Guidrlincs, loc.cit. undcr 8. (b). 
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and pesticides which fall into the ambit of the exchange and notification 
mechanism. 
The PIC procedure in the amended London Guidelines and integrated 
now in the FAO Code of Conduct constitutes a considerable step towards a 
more sophisticated regulatory scheme on the regulation with export and 
import of banned and severely restricted pesticides. The final adoption of 
the PIC procedure should be understood as the response of the developing 
countries to the efforts of OECD countries to impose the agreement on 
infonnation exchange and export notification upon developing countries. 
The compromise now found between industrialized nations and developing 
countries, the one defending the OECD system as being sufficient to deal 
with banned and severely restricted pesticides, and the other promoting the 
idea of a mechanism which would guarantee that the importing countries are 
infonned on the export of banned and severely restricted countries prior to 
export, led to the development of what has been phrased the "red flag 
approach". 
The PIC procedure is based on the idea that an alert list can be set up 
in negotiations between exporting and importing countries and that the 
importing countries have to make a decision as to whether they refuse the 
import of chemicals and pesticides being part of the !ist or whether they 
agree to the import of those products, perhaps even under specific 
restrictions. This regulatory model is discussed as "control action-related 
Prior Informed Consent Procedure", control action-related because prior 
infonned consent is bound to the control action and not to the concrete 
export. The crucial point of this system seems to be what kind of products 
under what conditions are to be put on the alert !ist. The solution appears 
quite pragmatic. lt was agreed that chemicals banned or severely restricted 
by ten or more countries will be automatically placed on the !ist while those 
banned or severely restricted by five or more countries but less than ten will 
be subject to an "informal consultative process," to determine whether they 
130 Cf. Regulation 1734/88 is now undcr rcvision, OJ C 17, 25.1.1991, 16 et seq. 
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meet the definitions of banned or severely restricted for health or 
environmental reasons as laid down in the London Guidelines and the FAO 
Code. Those meeting the definitions will be placed on the !ist. This system 
will apply to chemicals which have already been the subject of control 
actions before the implementation of the PIC scheme and will lead to the 
establishment of an initial "red flag" !ist. 
For chemicals banned or severely restricted after the circulation of 
the initial !ist, a different system will apply. These chemicals will 
automatically become subject to PIC requirements when a control action 
"rneeting the definitions of the London Guidelines" is taken and notified by 
a single government. Thus, action by any one government will be sufficient 
to make a chemical subject to PIC procedures internationally. However, 
reference is made here to "an informal consultative process" to "assist 
UNEP and FAO in determining whether the control action meets the 
definition". This places a certain amount of discretion on the UNEP, the 
FAO secretariates, the consulted competent national authorities and the 
experts. For the first time, a worldwide mechanism has been set up world-
wide to constantly review chemicals and pesticides whether thcy should be 
put on the "red flag !ist" because they are so dangerous that international 
trade needs to be regulated. 
The PTC procedure confers a key role to IRPTC. The latter has to 
ensure that the control action is disseminated to all participating countries 
and has to varify whether they agree to possible expons or refuse to receive 
them. The introduction of the PTC procedure has redefined the 
responsibilities of importing and exporting countries. Whereas the OECD 
model is largely based on the idea that primary responsibility lies with the 
importing country when deciding what to do with the information received, 
the PIC procedures now explicitly stans from the concept of shared 
responsibility between exporting and importing countries. The London 
arnended Guidelines clearly state: 
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lt should be the function of designate national authorities 
with regard to export of banned or severely restricted 
chemicals "to implement appropriate procedures, within 
their authority, designed to ensure that exports do not 
occur contrary to the PIC decisions or participating 
importing countries". 
Although the exact meaning of the reference seems to be far from 
being clearl31, exporting countries have accepted their responsibility to 
contribute to the implementation of the amended London Guidelines. 
3. Classification, packaging, labelling and technical assistance 
The PIC procedure does not provide for explicit classification, 
packaging and labelling rules. It deals more with fundamental principles. 
The states should recognize that chemicals exported from their territories are 
subject to no less stringent requirements of classification, packaging and 
labelling than comparable products designated for use in the state of export. 
A similar rule has been introduced in the EEC regulation 1734/88132. But 
the amended London Guidelines go one step further in asking states to take 
into account the special circumstances surrounding the management of 
chemicals in developing countries, in the process of elaborating and 
implementing already existing or future internationally harmonized 
procedures for the classifcation, packaging, and labelling of chemicals in 
international trade. 
The reference made to technical assistance shows that the 
implementation of the PIC procedure, the information exchange and the 
notification system is only possible if specific resources are made available 
by European countries to build up the necessary infrastructure in developing 
countries. This reference has initiated a number of activities of national 
development aid institutions and international organizations aimed at 
131 Cf. My papcr for the Ad Hoc Working Group of ExpcrLs on thc Implementation of 
the Amendcd London Guidelines, First Session, Nairobi. 15-19 October 1990, 
Proposals on drafl model national lcgislation on managmcnt of chcmicals for the 
implementation of the amcndcd London Guidclines, UNEP/PIC.WG.3/lnf.3, 11 
Octobcr 1990. 
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establishing the prerequisites for some kind of import control by evaluating 
and assessing the incoming data on banned or severely restricted 
pesticides 133. 
4. The regulations on banned and severely restricted products 
within UNEP and FAO and the GATT 
The message which can be taken from existing GA TI rules seems to 
be quite clear: any form of restricting the export of hazardous chemicals 
runs counter to the idea of GA TI to guarantee free trade worldwide, Art. 
XI134. There does not seem to exist a mechanism to allow states having 
signed the GATT Protocol to restrict the export for foreign policy reasons. 
Quite the contrary is true for importing countries, wishing to restrict the 
import of specifically hazardous products. Art. XX of the GA TI allows for 
import restrictions if the importing country is of the conviction that the 
goods endanger the health and the environment The only question here is to 
distinguish legitimate interests from protectionist considerations. The GATT 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade tries to balance out conflicting 
interests here by asking signatory states of the agreement to notify GA TI of 
their wish to restrict the import of certain products for health, safety and 
environmental reasonsl35. GATT has obviously no rules at its disposal to 
come to grips with the problem of deviating standards on health, safety and 
environmental protection. That lack of competences might well be the 
background for the interest of GA TI to develop its own rules now 136. 
l 32 Cf. Loc.ciL 
133 
134 
Cf. Most notahly, Implementation of lhe International Code of Conduct on the 
Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Technical Assistance Projcct Financed lhrought a 
Trust Fund Provided by the Govemment of Japan, Bangkok Thailand, 14-25 
November 1988, Workshop on Pesticides Regulatory Principles and Procedurcs for 
the Asian and lhc Pacific Region. 
Cf. M.Rom, fapon Controls in GATT, Journal of World Trade Law, 1984, 125 et 
seq. 
135 Cf. P.Mcrciai, Safcguard Mcasures in GATT, Journal of World Tradc Law 1981, 41 
et scq. 
136 Cf. J.Sankey, Domestically Prohibited Goods and Hazardous Substances - A New 
GATT Working Group is established, JWTL 1989, 99 et scq; cf. in a broader contcxt 
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C. Factors determining the process of 
intemationalization of chemical and pesticide 
regulation 
For the further development of the international regulation of 
chernicals and pesticides, it could be of interest to determine the factors 
which detennine the process of intemationalization. Tue conclusion, 
therefore, should be read as the preface for the ongoing debate regarding the 
feasibility of an international convemion on the production and use of 
chemicals and pesticides. UNEP has in mind to elaborate such a convention 
in the years to come. But this intention has not yet been explictly voiced, for 
UNEP fears strong and immediate objections from the industrialized 
countries 137. 
I. Economic and political incentives 
The most important irnpetus for the development of international 
regulatory mechanisms seem to be the fear of the industrialized countries 
that divergent national standards lead to new barriers to trade 138. The 
prevention of barriers to trade were behind coordinated efforts of OECD and 
EEC to come to a joint solution on the regulatory frame for the control of 
chemicals. The same is more or Jess true for the area of pesticides. Tue FAQ 
Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticidcs aims at the 
devclopment of a worldwide regulatory framc which guarantees the free 
flow of pesticides. 
137 
138 
the very helpful discussions on the relationship between US/EEC chemical regulation 
and GAIT, in International Regulation ofToxic Subsk~nces, loc.cit. 92 et seq. 101 et 
seq. 
One might undcrstand "The Draft Model National Legislation on the Management of 
Chemicals for the Implementation of the Amcnded London Guidelincs", elaborated 
by the Ad Hoc Working Group of Expcrts on the Implementation of thc Arncnded 
London Guidelincs, First scssion Nairobi, 15-19 October 1990, UNEP/PIC.WG. 3/3 
as a preparatory documcnt for an international convcntion. 
This assurnption is underscored by the most recent initiative of OECD to organise a 
workshop on "Economic Effects of PIC", 17-20 September 1991. 
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The overwhelming importance of the economic incentives for the 
prevention of technical barriers to trade resulting form divergent national 
control legislation does not mean that health, safety and environmental 
policy objectives are sct asidc. They may be pursued alongside the trade 
policy objectives, in some kind of a "pick-a-pack procedure". Although the 
impetus for the prevention of technical barriers to rrade improves the 
perspectives of international regulation of chemicals and pesticides 
considerably, it restricts, at the same time, the goals which can be achieved. 
lt is never health, safety and environmental protection as such which is 
subject to the regulatory concept; social protective objectives are inherently 
bound to the predominating free flow of chemical and pesticide policy. 
The different philosophies become clear when the question arises 
whether international rules should be developed for the protection of health 
and safcty at work. There was no opportunity to integrate the protection of 
health and safety at work when the frame of an international regulation on 
chemicals was discussed within the OECD and EEC. Ten years later the 
negative effects of differing standards on the protection of health and safety 
at work can no longer be denied. The United States haw already introduced 
in 1974, rules in their Trade Act providing for sanctions against importing 
countries which benefit from lower production costs because the health and 
safety at work standards are far below the standards of the United StatesI39. 
Defense strategies against unfair imports can easily be combined with 
health, safety and environmental objectives. Finland has just adopted a 
regulation imposing a charge per ton on oil delivered to its ports by tankers 
without double bottoms 140. lt is in the context of the steadily growing 
139 Cf. J.M. Zimmcnnann, Extraterritorial Application of Fcdcral Labor Laws: 
Congress's Flawed Extension of the ADEA, 21, Corncll International Law Journal 
1988, 103 et seq; !.Ch.Ballon, Tue Implications of Making thc Denial of 
Intcmationally Rccognizcd Workcr Rights Actionahle Undcr Scction 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, "8, Virginia Journal of International Law, 1987, 73 et seq. Fora 
background analysis cf. R.R.Kerton, Double Standards, Consumcr and workcr 
protection in an unequal world, 1990. 
140 In January 1990 Finland imposcd a charge of 2.20 markka a tonnc on oil delivered to 
its ports by tankcrs without double bottoms, thc Economist, 21-27 April 1990, 31. 
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importance of differing standards for the health and safety at work that the 
ILO convention must be seen. 
Despite the decisive role of economic incentives the importance of 
political incentives should not be underestimated. The striking example for 
the power of the political incentives is the development of rules on the 
regulation of banned and severely restriced pesticides and chemicals, most 
notably the adoption ofthe PIC procedure. Extensive pressure from different 
sides have lead to a regulatory mechanism which challenges GATT, in order 
to bring the free trade philosophy of the GATT rules close to that of UNEP 
which is more orientated towards safety and environmental protection. 
II. Unilateral action versus international action to control 
pesticides and chemicals 
The analysis of the regulatory mechanisms on the control of pesticides 
and chemicals makes clear that unilateral action is needed to legitimate and 
justify international action. The most striking example is the development of 
the regulation of banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides. 
Without the United States taking the lead in the late seventies there would 
have been no incentive for the international organisations like OECD, 
UNEP and FAQ ro internationalize the export/import issue. The same might 
be true for the development of international rules on the control of 
chemicals. Here, the close cooperation of the United States and the 
European Countries through OECD and EEC underscore the necessity for 
the development of genuine international rules which are not only adapted 
to the needs of the industrialized countries but take into consideration the 
developing countries as weil. 
The key role for the development of international rules on the control 
of chemicals will be incombent upon the UNEP. The history of the 
development of the rules on banned and severely restricted chemicals 
illustrates how the rule-making machinary could work. Here the OECD had 
defined the precedents for the international debate and it took a number of 
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years and extensive pressure to transform the OECD Guiding Principles 
aiming at serving the needs of the industrialized countries into a regulatory 
concept which fits into a world where developing countries play an ever-
increasing role. That is why the compromise found between the United 
States and the EEC member states could form the basis for the drafting of an 
international convention. Any effort of UNEP, however, has to take care of 
the effects on the international trade. A solution will be found only in 
coordination with GATT. The implications are far-reaching. lt might well be 
that the appearance of GA IT requires a broader approach integrating not 
only chemicals but also pesticides, in order to come to an international order 
on the control of pesticides and chemicals. 
III. National involvement in the control of chemicals and 
pesticides and international perspectives of action 
The relatively fast compromise between the United States and the 
European Community on the regulation of chemicals has been made 
possible by the mere fact that new regulatory models and new 
administrative procedures had tobe built up to cope with chemicals. lt is far 
easier to come to an international solution on the control of dangerous 
substances if there is no necessity to overcome national administrative 
structures and traditions. The same is true for the regulation of banned and 
severely restricted chemicals and pesticides. The PTC procedure constitutes 
a novelty, it is a genuine international instrument. There are no national 
traditions to be changed. An international convention on chemicals could 
benefit from the relatively young legal infrastructure. It could step into the 
vacuum which exists in the field of consumer and environmental protection, 
leaving space for the introduction of regulatory concepts which go beyong 
the pre-market control mechanism established in the industrialized 
countries. 
The development of international regulation of pesticides and 
medicines shows that it is very difficult, almost impossible to aim at a 
common solution to the control mechanism. Although the FAQ Code 
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provides for a registration procedure, a number of industrialized countries 
have introduced prior approval procedures which go far beyond the FAO 
compromise. The philosophy of the FAO Code sets the tone for the future 
regulation of chemicals. International rules could and should never be more 
that a common platform for the nation states. They remain free in leaving 
the platform and setting tighter standards for the protection of man and the 
environment. 
IV. Trends in the control of chemicals and pesticides 
From an analysis of the national, regional and international rules, it is 
possible to conclude that there is an overall trend to establish pre-market 
control procedures. Pre-market control is widely accepted in the field of 
pesticides but a consensus has almost been reached for the regulation of 
chemicals, too. The best pcrspectives for an international regulation seems 
to be an approach which would rely on a notification procedure, on a 
concept of shared responsibility between the manufacturers on the one hand 
and the competent control authorities on the other. 
But concentration on the pre-market control of chemicals and 
pesticides suffers from a major deficiency: it focuses too much on the 
control of the newly introduced chemicals and peslicides and neglects the 
dangers of all those chemicals and pesticides which have been or still are 
circulating without being effectively controlled before marketing or in cases 
where the risks become evident at a later date although they have been 
subject to some form of pre-market control. The most advanced 
industrialized countries are discovering the necessity to establish effective 
post market control mechanisms. Deviating market restrictions, however, 
close the markets and run counter to the idea of a free trade without 
technical barriers to trade. Harmonizing the access to the world market by 
introducing common pre-market control mechanisms is one side of the coin, 
harmonizing post market control is the other. The international regulation on 
banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides mainly in form of 
the PIC procedure constitutes an important step towards the development of 
international post market control management. But so far it is based on final 
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regulatory action. What is needed, however, is a mechanism which 
guarentees the collection and dissemination of risks in order to decide at an 
international level, which products should be subject to market restrictions. 
The PIC procedure constitutes a remarkable step forward in that direction, 
as it provides for the review of products which are not yet on the "red flag 
!ist". But it should be accomplished by a joint program of FAO and UNEP 
in cooperation with OECD to determine the most dangerous chemicals and 
pesticides which are still on the market and to formulate common criteria for 
testing the products and for making decisions. Nonetheless even such a joint 
approach at an international level needs unilateral action to keep progress 
moving. 
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